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FAITES UN DON – UTILISEZ LE BOUTON PAYPAL - MERCI



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 *AUTH: CO 434th G
 *DATE: 1 June 1944
 *INIT: J.A.C.
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ANNEX #1 to FO #1

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 of 25 Copies

NEPTUNE-BIGOT

Hq, 434th Tr Carrier Gp
 Station 467, U S Army
 1700, B.D.S.T.
 1 June 1944.

INTELLIGENCE

MAPS: (See Par. #6 "Maps & Aerial Photos")

1. SUMMARY OF INEM SITUATION:

a. Political and Economic: Omitted.

(For detailed basic intelligence covering economic, political and social conditions in the invasion area, refer to the following publications:

- PWE Basic Handbook - - - - - France
- PWE Zone Handbooks - - - - - Rouen, Rennes, Angers, Orleans and Paris
- Invade Mecum - - - - - Vol I & Supplement to Vol I
 Vol IV & Supplement to Vol IV
- T.I.S. Dossiers - - - - - ICA Sections
- T.I.S. Reviews - - - - - ICA Sections
- IRIS and ISTI Reports)

b. Subversive. The principal Collaborationist groups in France are the PPP (Parti Populaire Francaise) and the RNP (Rassemblement National Populaire). They differ but slightly in their beliefs and both are committed to the German cause. In rural areas their strength is not so great and this is particularly true in Normandy, because the Normans are, for the most part, conservative, independent, ruralities. Members of the Collaborationist parties and former members of the German Todt (construction) organization will either flee or go underground in the area occupied by our forces and become a source of espionage and sabotage.

The actual number of French who would take up arms against the Allies is insignificant and most of these would already be incorporated into German defense units. These open enemies belong to two organizations. The SOL (Service D'Ordre Legionnaire) or Marcel Deat's LNP (Legion National Populaire).

NOTE: Prior to the establishment of a Free French or AMG authority, necessary dealings with civil population should be carried on through prominent local citizens whose loyalty to the Allied Cause is known to be unquestioned. Local school masters, parish priests, members of the resistance groups, returning P/Ws and evacuees will, in general, be reliable and acceptable to the community.

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Correct behavior of our officers and enlisted men toward the French people is of utmost importance in securing cooperation. Disorderly behavior or an attitude of superiority on the part of Allied troops will make the Allied task much more difficult.

c. Climatological Averages:

The climate of the COSENTIN PENINSULA area is variable and unreliable in all seasons, but conditions start improving in March. Large changes in any or all the elements may occur in a few hours in any season. These alternating bad and fair spells vary from a day to a week.

(1) Winds.

During disturbed weather periods, the prevailing winds are from the West to South quadrant and often bring low cloud and sea fog.

In fair weather winds are usually from the Southeast (local dawn breezes in the Western areas of the Peninsula are usually from the East or Northeast; in the Eastern part of the Peninsula from the East or Southeast).

Winds of gale force occur only on an average of 30 days in a year, being more common in the winter season.

(2) Precipitation.

Rain is not restricted to seasons and may occur at any time.

(3) Fog.

Fog may occur in the early morning even in the summer. In coastal areas, poor visibility may predominate. Sea fogs are most prevalent in late spring.

(4) Visibilities.

Quiet periods with winds of less than 3 miles per hour often occur along the coast in early morning hours. During the spring season in these quiet periods there is usually little or no cloud or rain. Visibility at sea may be poor but not foggy. Such quiet periods are not likely to change quickly since they are due to firmly established anticyclonic conditions. Occasionally quiet periods do occur under low pressure area conditions when low cloud sheet with base at 500 feet and occasional rain can be expected. Visibility during such periods is apt to be poor. Forecasts of these periods under low

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pressure conditions are likely to be more unreliable than forecasts made under anticyclonic conditions. During each May and June there are likely to be approximately fifteen days on which calm periods will prevail. The total of the calm periods during these fifteen days, however, will be the equivalent of six days.

d. Terrain.

(1) General Outline. The CHEREBOURG PENINSULA (also known to the French as the COTENTIN PENINSULA) is a well-marked geographical projection of WEST NORMANDY approximately 23 miles wide, and extending into the ENGLISH CHANNEL on a general Northwest-Southeast axis approximately 27 miles long. Its irregular coastline is characterized by numerous inlets with sheer cliffs rising up to 300 feet high in the Northwest portion of the Peninsula, and low flat beaches predominating toward the South. On the East coast in the area between CARENTAN and MONTERBOURG there is a low marshy coastal plain about 3 miles long and extending inland from 1 to 2 miles, now largely wet and soft.

(2) Inland. The CHEREBOURG PENINSULA can be roughly divided into two regions:

(a) The North and Northwest where there are upland ridges immediately behind the city of CHEREBOURG extending from the Northeast to the Northwest, and continuing South from CAP DE LA HAGUE to LA HAYE DU PUIITS in a series of isolated knolls rising to a height of 500 feet. Frequent bare outcroppings and narrow, flat valleys characterize this region.

(b) The South-Central region. This is low undulating terrain, seldom exceeding 200 feet above sea level. Across the "neck" of the Peninsula lies the plain of CARENTAN, extending to LESSAY on the West. This flat region has a flood belt of 1 and 2 miles average width, extending northwest from CARENTAN for about 6 miles, then returning West in a half-mile wide belt for 10 miles. Another flood belt averaging 2 to 3 miles in width extends Southwest from CARENTAN for a distance of about 6 miles.

(3) Streams. In the Central and Northern section of the Peninsula streams generally are on a North-South axis with tributaries flowing into them from East to West. In the Southern portion of the Peninsula, the slower, meandering streams flow mostly to the South and from East to East, averaging 20 to 40 feet in width. Throughout the Southern region the flood plains of the streams are more noticeable.

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land marks than the streams themselves.

(4) DZ and LZ Areas. The proposed DZ and LZ areas are located in the Southern region of the Peninsula in the vicinity of STE MERE EGLISE and CARENTAN approximately 5 miles in from the East Coast.

e. Military Situation.

(1) Air. As of 19 May 1944, British Intelligence, A.I. 3(b), D of I (c), dated 24 May 1944, estimated the grand total strength of the GAF on all fronts at 5890 military aircraft of which 5350 were considered operational. In addition, the GAF was estimated, as of 19 May 1944, to have a total of transport types on all fronts of 1425 aircraft.

On the Western Front, including France, Belgium and Holland, the disposition of the GAF, as of 19 May 1944, was as follows:

LRB.....	250	
GA and AT.....	30	
SEF.....	240	(D)
TEF.....	40	(D) 280 (H)
Reconnaissance and coastal types.....	120	

a total of 960 aircraft (exclusive of transport types, but including some 90 aircraft used for special defensive purposes, such as flare-dropping, shadowing and investigational units).

In Germany (North of 49° N) and Southwest Germany (West of 13° E), the GAF disposition, as of 19 May 1944, was as follows:

LRB.....	230	
GA and AT.....	Nil	
SEF.....	450	(D) 250 (H)
TEF.....	140	(D) 350 (H)
Reconnaissance and special types.....	70	

a total of 1490 aircraft (exclusive of transport types, but including some 70 aircraft used for special defensive purposes such as flare-dropping, shadowing, and investigational units).

In transport type aircraft on the Western Front, including Germany, there were, as of 19 May 1944, 680 aircraft made up of 600 Ju.52's, 25 He.111's, 25 He.323's, and 30S.M. 82's. (A large proportion of non-operational units are included in these overall figures of GAF transport aircraft). It is evident, however, that it is possible for the GAF to assemble a sufficiently large force of aircraft and

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probably gliders as well, to accomplish the lift of a sizeable airborne force.

GAF Trends. In the SEF and LRB categories there has been some slight increase on the Western Front. Anti-shipping units in Southwest France have been strengthened somewhat and some He.177's are included in the LRB force in Western France (North of 46° N).

A Gruppe of SEF is now shown in Southwest France. The remainder of Western France (North of 46° N) has been reinforced by other SEF units drawn largely from bases further inland. Enemy intention is evidenced of still further augmenting fighter strength in Western France in the near future. There is evidence, too, in the construction of prepared strips adjacent to main landing areas and in the rehabilitation of obstructed fields and landing grounds in the vicinity of main bases, the GAF intends to maintain operations from selected inland airfields despite Allied attacks. Especially is this true of fields used by Channel reconnaissance aircraft, such as CAEN-CARDIQUET, CHERBOURG-MAUPERTUS, and others in this general area. Serviceable fighter landing grounds are present on both GUERNSEY and JERSEY ISLANDS and at LESSAY and CREPUN near the base of the CHERBOURG PENINSULA. On the Island of ALDERNEY there is an emergency fighter landing ground.

(2) Ground. The continuing demands for all available strength on the Russian Front, the enemy's recent reverses in Italy, his inability to withdraw substantial forces from the Scandinavian countries, and the increasing need for Balkan forces, makes it unlikely that the overall total of 59 divisions in France, Belgium and Holland, as of 24 May 1944, can be materially increased in the near future.

Latest available information indicates that these 59 divisions, composed of 10 Panzer type divisions, 15 to 18 Field Divisions (including 2 Parachute Divisions), 26 Lower Establishment Divisions, and 6 to 9 Training Divisions of various types, are now under the supreme command of Field Marshal Von Rundstedt. They are divided into 2 Army Groups with Field Marshal Rommel commanding one Army Group, and Field Marshal Blaskowitz heading the other. General Geyr von Schweppenberg is believed to be the Commander-in-Chief of armored units in the West.

Approximately one-half of these divisions are likely to be under normal T/O and weapons strength and are composed of polyglot nationalities whose morale and efficiency can be questioned. The greatest threat from enemy ground forces lies in the offensive type divisions, which are loyal, well trained and well-equipped.

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Enemy Ground Force Trends. There has been considerable reallocation of German ground force units in the West during the past two months. In the area nearest to our operations, the 319th L.E. Infantry Division occupies the 3 CHANNEL ISLANDS, 709th L.E. Infantry Division is in North-Central portion of CHERBOURG PENINSULA, while the 243rd L.E. Division, until recently located in Southern part of PENINSULA, has moved into its NORTH-WEST tip South and Southeast of area of our operations are located the 352nd Inf Field Division and the 716th L.E. Division. There has, however, been considerable movement of Panzer units. The 21st Panzer Division is reported as having moved from the vicinity of RENNES to the area South of CAEN. Unconfirmed, but likely reports, now place the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division "Götz von Berlichingen", formerly in the POITERS area, in the area vacated by the 21st. There are believed to be 2 Parachute Divisions in the West, the 3rd Parachute Division in Central BRITTANY (East of BREST) and the unidentified Parachute Division, formerly carried in the NANCY area, now located in the ST MALO-ST BRIEUC area. The SS "Hitler Jugend" Panzer Division is now listed as in the LIXILUX-BERNAY area and information from SHAEF, as of 24 May 1944, reported that troops detraining in the CARENTAN area in strength of 2000 to 9000 were probably the 91st Inf. Div. Evidence is accumulating that Von Rundstedt and Rommel are reorganizing, regrouping, and upgrading the so-called "Training Divisions" in the West, redispersing them with the major deployments of artillery and troops in NORMANDY.

(3) Naval. Omitted.

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION:

- a. When, and by what means will enemy first learn of Troop Carrier intentions?
- b. Will aerial bombardment by Allied a/c prior to TC mission effectively neutralize existing enemy ground defenses to an extent sufficient for passage of TC a/c thru "corridor" in adequate numbers for successful completion of mission?
- c. Will day and/or night fighter cover furnished as support for operation be able to effectively cope with possible efforts by enemy aircraft to intercept or divert TC column and its slow flying speed?
- d. How rapidly, and in what strength will mobile enemy AA installations be brought within range of "corridor"?
- e. Will Fighter and/or Air Support aviation be available for neutralization of such mobile installations after start of TC operations?

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f. Will anti-radar detection devices ("Window") be able to conceal precise location of TC a/c for period long enough to permit safe passage of lengthy column of TC a/c?

g. What will be the dispositions, strength, and effectiveness of enemy static defenses (flak, balloon barrages, searchlights, smoke, camouflage and obstacles) in the area of our operations?

h. What is the likelihood that enemy will mine or otherwise obstruct areas selected as LZ's and/or BE's for this operation?

3. ENEMY CAPABILITIES:

a. Radar. With proper security measures enforced, the enemy will first have knowledge of our intentions through radar "pick-up" from one or more of the belt of Freya and Wuerzburg stations located on the CHANNEL ISLANDS and on the OHLBERG PINSULA. At an altitude of 300 feet or more, the Freya stations will be able to determine our distance from the station and direction of flight approximately 30 to 37 miles away from the station. Wuerzburgs will record our distance, altitude and azimuth when formations approach within 25 miles of the station.

Conclusion. It can be assumed that the 2 Freya and 1 "Shipwatcher" stations on GUERNSEY ISLAND, combined with the dual Freya station located on CAP DE LA HAGUE, will alert the enemy of our approach from 10 to 15 minutes before landfall is made, and our progress will be "tracked" by the Wuerzburgs. The use of "Window" may make it possible to conceal the precise location of TC a/c for period long enough to make difficult the plotting of actual DZ and LZ by Radar.

b. Air. Enemy air attack on Troop Carrier units prior to take-off from departure airbases can be expected if the enemy is able, through air reconnaissance or espionage, to obtain information as to our general intentions to mount an airborne operation. Assuming that some degree of surprise is attained, time, speed, and distance factors existing now indicate that the enemy air forces' first alerting as to our intentions would come through radar detection from 20 to 25 minutes before the arrival of our first formations in the area of the DZ's and LZ's. Therefore, the greater possibility of attack by enemy air is to be expected in the vicinity of the drop and release areas and on the return route to bases. For operations scheduled after H-hour, the intensity of enemy air attack could be expected to increase because of the greater numbers of enemy aircraft already operating in the general area.

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Conclusion. It can be expected that the GAF will concentrate all available air power to prevent the successful completion of airborne operations. It is not believed that any large-scale attack will be attempted on departure airframes prior to take-off. Formations towing gliders can be expected to be special targets for enemy air attack. Adequate fighter cover enroute to, in the general area to DZ's and LZ's and covering the return route will minimize the possibility of enemy air attack on a large scale.

c. Ground Defenses (Mobile and Static).

(1) Mobile German ground force units are known to possess an abundance of small arms and automatic weapons fire which is effective to a high degree against low-flying aircraft. Large concentrations of ground troops, strong points and areas heavily defended by ground troops can be expected to deliver maximum fire power against low flying aircraft. It is not expected that the enemy will have sufficient advance knowledge of our approach routes to effect planned in advance disposition of this type of fire power against us.

Conclusion: A definite hazard is present in the concentrated fire of small arms and automatic weapons from ground units to our low altitude formations. Routes have, therefore, been selected to avoid, as much as possible, such concentrations and it is expected that a considerable amount of such fire power will be neutralized by bombing and strafing activities of air support aircraft. For Troop Carrier operations on D-plus days, the possibilities must be considered of the necessity for the selection of new routes due to possible later dispositions of enemy ground forces in their attempts to restrict our bridgehead.

(2) Static Defenses.

(a) Flak. One of the greatest hazards to Troop Carrier operations is the fire from fixed AA guns. Routes have been selected carefully to avoid, wherever possible, the fire circles of the known enemy fixed gun positions. Air support requests have been made giving priority to these gun positions considered the greatest threats to Troop Carrier formations.

Later information as it is received will be promptly disseminated through Intelligence channels.

Conclusion. Of greatest concern to Troop Carrier formations are the heavy flak positions on the CHANNEL ISLANDS and the light and heavy gun positions on the CHERBOURG PENINSULA, whose fire arcs are near the planned routes or in the vicinity of the drop and release areas. By keeping to the planned routes and within a 1-mile

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corridor along the route between the Islands, little or no interference should be encountered from these positions. It is expected that there will be lessening or neutralization of some of the positions nearest Troop Carrier routes through the action of Air Support.

(b) Balloons, barrages, searchlights, smoke, camouflage, and obstacles. No balloons have been reported in the area. Searchlights, camouflage and obstacles are not expected to be effective deterrents against Troop Carrier operations. Smoke may be employed by enemy ground forces, coastal units, or enemy aircraft in an attempt to interfere with our operations but it is not believed it would be an effective deterrent to our operations.

d. Naval. Enemy naval craft armed with flak and automatic weapons can be expected to bring all available fire power to bear on low-flying aircraft wherever they come within range.

Conclusion. Due to the general nature of the operations on the sea, the presence of powerful Allied naval forces, and the fact that there are no known fixed enemy naval units stationed at points along the Troop Carrier routes, it is not believed that enemy naval forces will constitute a serious hazard to our operations.

4. MEASURES TO OBTAIN INFORMATION:

a. Aviation.

(1) Reconnaissance Missions. Visual reconnaissance will be provided in accordance with provisions of Memorandum No. 20-16, Headquarters, Ninth Air Force, 16 May 1944.

(2) Aerial Photography. Photographic reconnaissance will be provided in accordance with provisions of Memorandum No. 20-16, Headquarters, Ninth Air Force, 16 May 1944.

Aerial photographs of the general areas in which Troop Carrier-Airborne operations have been conducted will be obtained at the first opportunity following the completion of scheduled missions.

b. Intelligence Agencies.

(1) Higher Echelons.

(a) Intelligence will be furnished to Headquarters, Ninth Air Force, in the field by RAF 2nd TAF; 2nd AF, 21st Army Group; First U S Army Group; Air Ministry; Headquarters, USAAF; U S War Department; Naval Intelligence Division of U S Navy; British War Office; British Admiralty; USSTAF in the United Kingdom; and the Theatre Intelligence Section. Pertinent intelligence gained from these agencies will be

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supplied to Headquarters, IX Troop Carrier Command, by Headquarters, Ninth Air Force, and disseminated by Command Headquarters to 53rd Troop Carrier Wing Headquarters, thence to Group Headquarters.

(b) Phot. Intelligence. The 20th P.I. Detachment, Ninth Air Force, will perform detailed interpretation of photo cover for dissemination to interested units. Personnel of the P.I. Detachment will be stationed, as required, with tactical reconnaissance units. Further details as to photo intelligence are contained in Memorandum No. 20-16, Headquarters, Ninth Air Force, 16 May 1944.

(c) Signal Radio Intelligence Units. The 3rd AAF Radio Squadron, Mobile, under the control of the Signal Corps, will operate in the field for the provision of intelligence by interception of enemy radio traffic. Detachments of this Squadron will be placed with tactical Command Headquarters for the provision of immediate intelligence, locations to be dictated by the necessities of the tactical situation. By means of periodic broadcasts full facilities of radio intercept establishments in the United Kingdom will be available to the Signal Intelligence Sections of the Ninth Air Force. Signal Intelligence information received from Headquarters, Ninth Air Force, will be disseminated by IX Troop Carrier Command Headquarters to lower echelons.

(2) Lower and Neighboring Echelons.

(a) G-2, 101st U.S. Airborne Division; G-2, 82nd U.S. Airborne Division; IX Troop Carrier Command, Group Intelligence Sections, through Intelligence Section of 53rd Troop Carrier Wing.

5. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE:

a. Security in Planning.

(1) Every security precaution will be taken to prevent knowledge of target areas and date of operations, location of departure airbases, units involved, routes to be followed, designations of DZ's and LZ's, location of assembly points and control points, code information or any details pertaining to operation from being made available to any persons not authorized to have access to such material by authority of Top Secret Control, Headquarters, Ninth Air Force, under Top Secret Control procedure.

b. Special Measures to be Employed Prior to D-Day and D-Plus Day:

(1) Counterintelligence procedure will be in accordance with Security Plan #1 as set forth in Memorandum No. 46-2, Headquarters

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USMAF Station G-467, dated 17 May 1944, as amended and supplemented, and Security directives as issued by Headquarters, 53rd Troop Carrier Wing, as promulgated in accordance with Ltr, Headquarters, IX Troop Carrier Command, 21 May 1944, subject: "Security Directive for Operation 'NEPTUNE'".

(2) Briefing levels will be as directed by the Commanding General, IX Troop Carrier Command.

(3) Countersigns obtainable in the United Kingdom will be in accordance with letter "Subject Countersigns", Headquarters, Ninth Air Force, 21 May 1944.

(4) Group security procedure for Field Orders will be SOP as set out in Intelligence Bulletin, No. 110-2, Headquarters, 434th Troop Carrier Group, dated 16 April 1944.

c. P/W and E and F Procedure.

(1) The S-2 Officer responsible for distribution of Aid Boxes and Purses will issue to the pilot of each aircraft one purse and one Aid Box for each combat crew member. A memorandum receipt will be accomplished by the pilot for the total number of Aid Boxes and Purses issued.

(2) At the time of the issuance of Aid Boxes and Purses, the S-2 Officer will collect all personal property of each individual and will be responsible for the safekeeping of such property pending its return to the rightful owner. No personal papers or official documents will be carried.

(3) Upon the return of the aircraft, the pilot will return all Aid Boxes and Purses to the S-2 Officer, at which time the personal property of the personnel of the aircraft will be returned to him. The pilot's memorandum receipt will be returned to him if all Aid Boxes and Purses and their contents are intact. In the event one or more Aid Boxes or Purses, or the contents of either one or both are not returned, the S-2 Officer will itemize the missing Aid Boxes, Purses or parts thereof and list the name, rank and serial number of the pilot and the personnel involved, include the date and time of mission and submit a detailed report of all matters incident thereto to Headquarters, 53rd Troop Carrier Wing, Attention A-2. In the latter case, the S-2 officer will retain the pilot's original memorandum receipt for Aid Boxes and Purses pending release from Wing Headquarters, and will issue a temporary receipt to the pilot for the Aid Boxes, Purses or parts thereof returned.

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(4) Glider crews will be furnished purses only. Procedure, responsibility and accountability will be as detailed in paragraphs c.(1), (2), and (3).

d. Measures for Handling P/W and Captured Documents.

(1) A Field Interrogation Unit of the PW and X Detachment, European Theatre of Operations, will be attached to the Ninth Air Force for immediate interrogation of air prisoners captured in the field. Interrogation teams will operate in the combat zone under the control of the Chief of the Field Interrogation Unit. They will be disposed as indicated by the requirements of the tactical situation. Field interrogation will be as brief as possible with the object of gaining immediate intelligence for dissemination to units in the field. P/W should, in every case, be promptly turned over to the nearest P/W enclosure, cage or collecting point after search and segregation.

6. MAPS AND AERIAL PHOTOS:

a. Operational Maps.

(1) 1:500,000 GSGS 4072 (Air), sheets: THE BORDER, MIDLAND AND WALES, SOUTHWEST ENGLAND, NORTH SEA, STRAITS OF DOVER, LE HAVRE, PARIS, BRIST, NANTES, DIJON.

(2) 1:250,000 GSGS 3982 (Air) Sheets: CHANNEL ISLANDS, BRIST, LANNION, CHERBOURG, RENNES, ROUEN, BULOGNES, CHARTRES.

(3) 1/4 inch to 1 mile, GSGS 3957, Sheets ENGLAND EAST, NORTH WALES AND MANCHESTER, NORTH MIDLANDS AND LINCOLNSHIRE, SOUTH WALES, MIDLANDS, EAST ENGLAND, ENGLAND SOUTHWEST, SOUTH ENGLAND, ENGLAND SOUTHEAST AND LONDON.

(4) Lattice Charts, GSGS 4153A, LC II, Sheets: ISLE OF MAN, IPSWICH, PEMBROKE, PARIS.

(5) 1:50,000, GSGS 4250, Sheets 5E/4, 5E/6, 6F/2, 6F/1, 6E/5

(6) (a) Photomaps scale 1:25,000 of area.
(b) Special maps 0-2, 0-3 scale 1:50,000 run in.

b. Planning Maps.

(1) 1:25,000, Defense overprints - 28/20 Northeast, Northwest, Southeast, Southwest; 31/20 Northeast, Northwest, Southeast, Southwest; 28/18 Northeast, Northwest, Southeast, Southwest; 31/18 Northeast, Northwest, Southeast, Southwest.

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c. Miscellaneous:

- (1) Gazetteers: France, Belgium and Holland, 1:250,000 and 1:50,000.
- (2) Graticule/Grid Conversion Diagrams.
- (3) Terrain models for briefing purposes of STE MERE EGLISE area, scale 1:5,000 and run-in model, scale 1:25,000 - will be available at Wing for study.

d. Aerial Photographs.

- (1) Mosaic enlargements of DZ and LZ.
- (2) Vertical enlargements of LZs.
- (3) Mosaic of run-in strip.
- (4) Oblique photos of coastal strip.

7. WEATHER, AIR-SEA RESCUE:

a. Air-Sea Rescue Briefing.

- (1) Crews will be briefed by an officer trained in Air-Sea Rescue Procedure on latest "ditching" procedures.

b. Weather Information Sources.

- (1) Latest weather information will be obtained through detachment of the 21st Weather Squadron and by the Group Weather officer at briefing time.

8. REPORTS AND DISSEMINATION:

a. SCP for Intelligence Reports.

- (1) Ninth Air Force Memorandum No 55-8, "Operations Mission Report", 29 March 1944, and accompanying appendices, prescribes reporting procedure from lower echelons to higher echelons.
- (2) Operational Intelligence reports from Headquarters, Ninth Air Force to lower echelons will be rendered through normal channels unless operational urgency requires more direct transmission. Reports will include information of results of operations; changes in enemy order of battle, air and ground; status of enemy airfields; changes in target status; static defenses and enemy tactics.

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b. Procedure for Detailed Intelligence Reports.

(1) Immediately upon interrogation of returning crews the Group S-2 will transmit by the quickest possible means Flash Reports to Wing A-2, using Form (Appendix "B") as directed by Memorandum No. 55-8, Headquarters, Ninth Air Force, 29 March 1944.

(2) Forms in Wing A-2 Section to be used for transmission of Flash Reports are: Transfer 2, and Transfer 42.

"Operational priority" will be requested for flash Reports. Only in the event of failure of telephone communication will Flash Reports be sent by teleprinter from this Group to Wing.

(3) Oprep "B" (Form 340), as prescribed in Ninth Air Force Memorandum No. 55-8, 29 March 1944, will be prepared and delivered as directed.

c. Public Relations.

(1) Public Relations activities will be in accordance with Memorandum No. 45-3, Headquarters, Ninth Air Force, 29 January 1944, and Memorandum No. 45-3, Headquarters, IX Troop Carrier Command, 21 February 1944.

d. History.

(1) Historical officer of this Group will insure the maintenance of historical records with supporting documents.

GARLAND
Lt Col, AC,
EX C.

OFFICIAL:

Chantray
CHANTRAY,
Maj, AC,
S-2.

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