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HEADQUARTERS
52ND TROOP CAIRIFF WING, AAF
APO 133, U. S. Army

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Annex No. 1 to F.O. No. 1 Operation "Neptune"

INTELLIGENCE

SECTION I - SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION

1. Current Estimate of the Situation.

a. Political and Economic.

(1) Germany: For over a year the enemy situation has deteriorated progressively on the ground, in the air, and on the sea. This change in the enemy fortunes has caused political restlessness within the axis and a definite lowering of morale on the home front. It is safe to assume that the bulk of the German people no longer expect a German-imposed peace though they are not yet resigned to total defeat. Organized opposition to the existing regime is, however, still lacking, due to the control measures exercised by the Nazis. Deterioration of morale is evident in some branches of the German Army, but has not yet reached the stage where the fighting value of the services is seriously affected. German economy is showing the strain of the sea blockade and of Allied bombing of industries. In particular, the potential of the enemy aircraft and aircraft component factories has been seriously reduced.

(2) France: The collapse of France plunged the French people into a state of political lethargy from which only the Collaborationists and the Resistance Groups emerged. As the fortunes of the United Nations advanced, so the hopes of the French people rose again. It is believed that at this time aid by the civilian population to the invasion forces will be widespread. However, apart from activities of the more determined Resistance Groups, such aid will be unorganized and casual, at least until the success of the Allied venture seems assured.

b. Subversive. The principal Collaborationist groups in France are the PPF (Parti Populaire Francaise) and the RNP (Rassemblement National Populaire). They differ but slightly in their beliefs and both are committed to the German cause. In rural areas their strength is not so great and this is particularly true in Normandy, because the Normans are, for the most part, conservative and independent. Members of the Collaborationist parties and former members of the German Todt (construction) organization will either flee or go underground in the area occupied by our forces and become a source of espionage and sabotage. The actual number of French who would take up arms against the Allies is insignificant and most of these would already be incorporated into German defense units. These open enemies belong to two organizations, the SOL (Service D'Ordre Legionnaire) or Marcel Deat's LNP (Legion National Populaire).

NOTE: Prior to the establishment of a Free French or AMG authority, necessary dealings with civil population should be carried on through prominent local citizens whose loyalty to the Allied Cause is known to be unquestioned. Local school masters, parish priests, members of the resistance groups, returning P/W's and evacuees will, in general, be reliable and acceptable to the community.

Correct behaviour of our officers and enlisted men toward the French people is of utmost importance in securing cooperation. Disorderly behaviour or an attitude of superiority on the part of Allied troops will make the Allied task much more difficult.

c. Climate.

The climate of the COTENTIN PENINSULA area is variable and unreliable in all seasons. Large changes in any or all the elements may occur in a few hours in any season. These alternating bad and fair spells vary from a day to a week.



(1) Winds.

During disturbed weather periods, the prevailing winds are from the West to South quadrant and often bring low cloud and sea fog. In fair weather winds are usually from the southeast (local dawn breezes in the Western areas of the Peninsula are usually from the East or Northeast; in the Eastern part of the Peninsula from the East or Southeast). Winds of gale force occur only on an average of 30 days in a year, being more common in the winter season.

(2) Precipitation.

Rain is not restricted to seasons and may occur at any time.

(3) Fog.

Fog may occur in the early morning even in the summer. In coastal areas, poor visibility may predominate. Sea fogs are most prevalent in late spring.

(4) Visibilities.

Quiet periods with winds of less than 3 miles per hour often occur along the coast in early morning hours. During the spring season in these quiet periods there is usually little or no cloud or rain. Visibility at sea may be poor but not foggy. Such quiet periods are not likely to change quickly since they are due to firmly established anticyclonic conditions. Occasionally quiet periods do occur under low pressure area conditions when low cloud sheet with base at 500 feet and occasional rain can be expected. Visibility during such periods is apt to be poor. Forecasts of these periods under low pressure conditions are likely to be more unreliable than forecasts made under anti-cyclonic condition. During each May and June there are likely to be approximately fifteen days on which calm periods will prevail. The total of the calm periods during these fifteen days, however, will be the equivalent of six days.

d. Terrain.

(1) General Outline. The CHERBOURG PENINSULA (also known to the French as the COCOTIN PENINSULA) is a well-marked geographical projection of WEST NORMANDY approximately 23 miles wide, and extending into the ENGLISH CHANNEL on a general Northwest-Southeast axis approximately 27 miles long. Its irregular coastline is characterized by numerous inlets with sheer cliffs rising up to 300 feet high in the Northwest portion of the Peninsula, and low flat beaches predominating toward the South. On the East coast in the area between CALENTAN and MONTEBOURG there is a low marshy coastal plain about 8 miles long and extending inland from 1 to 2 miles, now largely wet and soft.

(2) Inland. The CHERBOURG PENINSULA can be roughly divided into two regions:

(a) The North and Northwest where there are upland ridges immediately behind the city of CHERBOURG extending from the Northeast to the Northwest, and continuing south from CAP DE LA HAGUE to LA HAYE DU PUISS in a series of isolated knolls rising to a height of 500 feet. Frequent bare outcroppings and narrow, flat valleys characterize this region.

(b) The South-Central Region. This is low undulating terrain, seldom exceeding 200 feet above sea level. Across the "neck" of the Peninsula lies the plain of CALENTAN, extending to LESSAY on the West. This flat region has a flood belt of 1 and 2 miles average width, extending Northwest from CALENTAN for about 6 miles, then returning West in a half-mile wide belt for 10 miles. Another flood belt averaging 2 to 3 miles in width extends Southwest from CALENTAN for a distance of about 6 miles.

(3) Streams. In the Central and Northern section of the Peninsula streams generally are on a North-South axis with tributaries flowing in to them from East to West. In the Southern portion of the peninsula, the slower, meandering streams flow mostly to the South and from West to East, averaging 20 to 40 feet in width. Throughout the Southern region the flood plains of the streams are more noticeable as landmarks than the streams themselves.



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(4) DZ Areas. The DZ areas "P", "O" and "T" are located in the Southern region of the Peninsula in the vicinity of STE MERE EGLISE approximately 5 miles from the East Coast. (See Run In Map Overlay, Maps G3G3# 4250 - Sheets: GE/324, SE/4, SE/5, SE/6, SE/6).

c. Military Situation.

(1) Air. On the Western Front, including France, Belgium and Holland, the disposition of the GAF, as of 19 May 1944, was as follows:

IPB.....	250
GA and AT.....	30
SEF.....	240 (D)
TEF.....	40 (D) 280 (H)
Reconnaissance and coastal types.....	120

a total of 960 aircraft exclusive of transport types, but including some 90 aircraft used for special defensive purposes, such as flare-dropping, shadowing and investigational units.

In transport type aircraft on the Western Front, including Germany, there were as of 19 May 1944, 680 aircraft made up of 600 Ju.52's, 25 He.111's, 25 He.323's, and 30 S.M. 82's. (A large proportion of non-operational units are included in these overall figures of GAF transport aircraft) It is evident, however, that it is possible for the GAF to assemble a sufficiently large force of aircraft and probably gliders as well, to accomplish the lift of a sizeable airborne force.

In the SEF and IPB categories there has been some slight increase on the Western Front. Anti-shiping units in Southwest France have been strengthened somewhat and some He.177's are included in the IPB force in Western France (North of 46° N).

A Gruppe of SEF is now shown in Southwest France. The remainder of Western France (North of 46° N) has been reinforced by other SEF units drawn largely from bases further inland. Enemy intention is evidenced of still further augmenting fighter strength in Western France in the near future. There is evidence, too, in the construction of prepared strips adjacent to main landing areas and in the rehabilitation of obstructed fields and landing grounds in the vicinity of main bases, the GAF intends to maintain operations from selected inland airfields despite Allied attacks. Especially is this true of fields used by Channel reconnaissance aircraft, such as CAEN-CARDIQUET, CHERBOURG-MAUPERTUS, AND others in this general area. Serviceable fighter landing grounds are present on both GUERNSEY and JERSEY ISLANDS and at LESSAY and CREPUN near the base of the CHERBOURG PENINSULA. On the Island of ALDERNEY there is an emergency fighter landing ground.

(See Appendix "B", "Enemy Order of Battle -- Air" to Annex 1 to 52nd Troop Carrier Wing, Field Order No. 1 for operation "NEPTUNE")

(2) Ground. The continuing demands for all available strength on the Russian Front, the enemy's recent reverses in Italy, his inability to withdraw substantial forces from the Scandinavian countries, and the increasing need for Balkan forces, makes it unlikely that the overall total of 58 divisions in France, Belgium and Holland can be materially increased in the near future.

Latest available information indicates that these 58 divisions, composed of 10 Panzer type divisions, 15 to 18 Field Divisions (including 2 Parachute Divisions), 25 lower Establishment Divisions, and 6 to 9 Training Divisions of various types, are now under the supreme command of Field Marshal Von Rundstedt. They are divided into 2 Army Groups with Field Marshal Rommel commanding one Army Group, and Field Marshal Blaskowitz heading the other. General Geyr von Schweppenberg is believed to be the Commander in Chief of armoured units in the West.

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Approximately one-half of these divisions are likely to be under normal T/O and weapons strength. Many are composed of polyglot nationalities whose morale and efficiency can be questioned. The greatest threat from enemy ground forces lies in the offensive type divisions, which are loyal, well-trained and well-equipped.

Enemy Ground Force Trends. There has been considerable reallocation of German ground force units in the West in the past two months. In the area nearest to our operations there have been no reported changes in the 319th L.E. Infantry Division which occupies the 3 CHANNEL ISLANDS, the 709th L. E. Infantry Division still occupies the northern portion of the CHERBOURG PENINSULA, the 243rd L.E. Division is still in the Southern part of the Peninsula, and Southeast of the base of the Peninsula are the 352nd Infantry Field Division and the 718th L. E. Division. There has, however, been considerable movement of panzer units. The 21st Panzer Division is reported as having moved from the vicinity of RENNES to the area South of CAEN. Unconfirmed, but likely reports, now place the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division "Goetz von Berlichingen", formerly in the POITIERS area, in the area vacated by the 21st. There are believed to be 2 Parachute Divisions in the West, the 3rd Parachute Division in Central BRITTANY (East of BREST) and the unidentified parachute Division, formerly carried in the NAICY area, now located in the ST MALO-ST BRIEUC area. The SS "Hitler Jugend" Panzer Division is now listed as in the LISIEUX-BERNAY area and information from FUSAG, as of 25 May 1944, reported that troops detrainning in the CARENTAN area in strength of 8000 to 9000 were possible part of the LXXXIV Army Corps. Evidence is accumulating that Von Rundstedt and Rommel are reorganizing, regrouping, and upgrading the so-called "Training Divisions" in the West, redispersing them with the major deployments of artillery and troops in NORMANDY.

(For details of dispositions and characteristics of enemy ground forces, see Appendix "C" Enemy Order of Battle - Ground, " to Annex 1 to 52nd Troop Carrier Wing Field Order No. 1 for Operation "NEPTUNE").

(3) Naval. Germany's effective naval strength, in the near future in Northern and Western Europe, will be:

- 2 Pocket Battleships
- 2 8-inch Cruisers
- 4 6-inch Cruisers
- 2 Old Battleships
- 23 to 24 Destroyers
- 8 Elbing Class Destroyers
- 25 to 28 Torpedo Boats
- 80 to 90 E-Boats

The containing of larger German naval units in their present areas by Allied naval task forces assigned for the purpose precludes the possibility of large scale enemy naval action. The enemy can, however, be expected to muster a large force of smaller craft, including submarines, destroyers, E-boats, R-boats, Siebel ferries, Sperrbrechers, minesweepers and other small craft heavily armed with AA guns, in the ENGLISH CHANNEL for anti-invasion use.

SECTION II - ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

1. Essential Elements of Information - Troop Carrier Operations.

a. Enemy Knowledge of our Intentions.

(1) When and by what means will the enemy first learn of our intentions?

b. Capabilities - Enemy Air.

(1) When, where, and on what scale will enemy air attack be directed against our operations?

c. Capabilities - Enemy Ground (Mobile and Static Defenses).

(1) When, where, and on what scale will enemy ground troops and mobile firepower be able to interfere with our operations?

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(2) What will be the dispositions, strength, and effectiveness of enemy static defenses (flak, balloon barrages, searchlights, smoke camouflage and obstacles) in the area of our operations?

1. Capabilities - Enemy Naval.

(1) When, where and how will enemy naval forces be able to interfere with our operations?

2. Analysis of Enemy Capabilities and Possible Enemy Action.

a. Radar. With proper security measures enforced, the enemy will first have knowledge of our intentions through radar "pick-up" from one or more of the belt of Freya and Wuerzburg stations located on the CHANNEL ISLANDS and on the CHERBOURG PENINSULA. At an altitude of 300 feet or more, the Freya stations will be able to determine our distance from the station and direction of flight approximately 30 to 57 miles away from the station. Wuerzburgs will record our distance, altitude and azimuth when formations approach within 25 miles of the station.

Conclusion. It can be assumed that the 2 Freya and 1 "Shipwatcher" stations on GUERNSEY ISLAND, combined with the dual Freya station located on CAP DE LA HAGUE, will alert the enemy of our approach from 10 to 15 minutes before landfall is made, and our progress will be "tracked" by the Wuerzburgs. The use of "window screening" may accomplish two purposes. First, to make plotting of our approach difficult or impossible. Secondly, to preclude location of actual drop zones and landing zones by radar.

(See Appendix "D", Analysis and Overlay, "Radar and W/T", to Annex No 1 to 52nd Troop Carrier Wing Field Order No 1 for operation "NEPTUNE").

b. Air. Enemy air attack on Troop Carrier units prior to take-off from departure airdromes can be expected if the enemy is able to obtain information as to our general intentions to mount an airborne operation. Assuming that some degree of surprise is attained, time, speed, and distance factors existing now indicate that the first alerting of enemy air forces as to our intentions would come through radar detection from 20 to 25 minutes before the arrival of our first formations in the area of the DZ's. Therefore, the greater possibility of attack by enemy air is to be expected in the vicinity of the drop areas and on the return route to bases. For operations scheduled after H-Hour, the intensity of enemy air attack could be expected to increase because of the greater numbers of enemy aircraft already operating in the general area.

Conclusion. It can be expected that the GAF will concentrate all available air power to prevent the successful completion of airborne operations. It is not believed that any large-scale attack will be attempted on departure airdromes prior to take-off. Adequate fighter cover enroute to, in the general area to DZ's and covering the return route will minimize the effectiveness of enemy air attack.

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c. Ground Defenses (Mobile and Static).

(1) Mobile German ground force units are known to possess an abundance of small arms and automatic weapons fire which is effective to a high degree against low-flying aircraft. Large concentrations of ground troops, strong points and areas heavily defended by ground troops can be expected to deliver maximum fire power against low-flying aircraft. It is not expected that the enemy will have sufficient advance knowledge of our approach routes to effect planned in advance disposition of fire power against us.

Conclusion. A definite hazard is present in the concentrated fire of small arms and automatic weapons from ground units to our low-altitude formations. Routes have, therefore, been selected to avoid, as much as possible, such concentrations and it is expected that a considerable amount of such fire power will be neutralized by bombing and strafing activities of air support aircraft. For Troop Carrier operations on D-plus days, the possibilities must be considered of the necessity for the selection of new routes due to possible later dispositions of enemy ground forces in their attempts to restrict our bridgehead.

(2) Static Defenses.

(a) Flak. One of the greatest hazards to Troop Carrier operations is the fire from fixed AA guns. Routes have been selected carefully to avoid, wherever possible, the fire circles of the known enemy fixed gun positions considered the greatest threats to Troop Carrier formations. Air support requests have been made giving target priority to such gun positions.

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(For detailed information on enemy flak dispositions and effective arcs of fire, see Appendices "E" and "E-1", Analysis and Overlay, "Enemy Static Defenses", to Annex 1 to 52nd Troop Carrier Wing Field Order No 1 for operation "NEPTUNE".)

Later information, as it is received, will be promptly disseminated through Intelligence channels.

Conclusion. Of greatest concern to Troop Carrier formations are the heavy flak positions on the CHANNEL ISLANDS and the light and heavy gun positions on the CHERBOURG PENINSULA, whose fire arcs are near the planned routes or in the vicinity of the drop and release areas. By keeping to the planned routes and within a corridor along the route between the Islands, little or no interference should be encountered from these positions. It is expected that there will be lessening or neutralization of some of the positions nearest Troop Carrier routes through the action of Air Support Aircraft.

(b) Balloon barrages, searchlights, smoke, camouflage, and obstacles. No balloons have been reported in the area. Searchlights, camouflage and obstacles are not expected to be effective deterrents against Troop Carrier Operations. Smoke may be employed by enemy ground forces, coastal units, or enemy aircraft in an attempt to interfere with our operations but it is not believed it would be an effective deterrent to our operations.

d. Naval. Enemy naval craft armed with flak and automatic weapons can be expected to bring all available fire power to bear on low-flying aircraft wherever they come within range.

Conclusion. Due to the general nature of the operations on the sea, the presence of powerful Allied naval forces, and the fact there are no known fixed enemy naval units stationed at points along the Troop Carrier routes, it is not believed that enemy naval forces will constitute a serious hazard to our operations.

SECTION III MEASURES TO OBTAIN INFORMATION

1. Aviation.

a. Reconnaissance Missions.

Visual reconnaissance will be provided in accordance with provisions of Memorandum No 20-16, Headquarters, Ninth Air Force, 16 May 1944.

b. Aerial Photo Reconnaissance.

Photographic reconnaissance will be provided in accordance with provisions of Memorandum 20-16, Headquarters, Ninth Air Force, 16 May 1944.

Aerial photographs of the general areas in which Troop Carrier-Air borne operations have been conducted will be obtained at the first opportunity following the completion of scheduled missions.

2. Intelligence Agencies.

a. Higher Echelons.

(1) Intelligence will be furnished to Headquarters, Ninth Air Force, in the field by RAF 2nd Tactical Air Force; Allied Expeditionary Air Force; 21st Army Group; First U S Army Group; Air Ministry; Headquarters, USAAF; U S War Department; Naval Intelligence Division of U S Navy; British War Office; British Admiralty; USSTAF in the United Kingdom; and the Theatre Intelligence Section. Pertinent intelligence gained from these agencies will be supplied to Headquarters, IX Troop Carrier Command, by Headquarters, Ninth Air Force, and disseminated by Command Headquarters to IX Troop Carrier Command Wing Headquarters

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(2) Photo Intelligence. The 20th P.I. Detachment, Ninth Air Force, will perform detailed interpretation of photo cover for dissemination to interested units. Personnel of the P.I. Detachment will be stationed, as required, with tactical reconnaissance units. Further details as to photo intelligence are contained in Memorandum No 20-16, Headquarters, Ninth Air Force, 16 May 1944.

(3) Signal Radio Intelligence Units. The 3rd AAF Radio Squadron, Mobile, under the control of the Signal Corps, will operate in the field for the provision of intelligence by interception of enemy radio traffic. Detachments of this Squadron will be placed with tactical Command Headquarters for the provision of immediate intelligence, locations to be dictated by the necessities of the tactical situation. By means of periodic broadcasts full facilities of radio intercept establishments in the United Kingdom will be available to the Signal Intelligence Sections of the Ninth Air Force. Signal Intelligence information received from Headquarters, Ninth Air Force, will be disseminated by IX Troop Carrier Command Headquarters to lower echelons.

b. Lower and Neighboring Echelons. G-2, 101st U.S. Airborne Division; G-2, 82nd U.S. Airborne Division; IX Troop Carrier Command Group Intelligence Sections, through Intelligence Sections of 50th, 52nd, and 53rd Troop Carrier Wings.

SECTION IV COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

1. Security in Planning.

Every security precaution will be taken to prevent knowledge of target areas and date of operations, location of departure airdromes, units involved, routes to be followed, designations of DZ's, locating of assembly points and control points, code information or any details pertaining to operation "NEPTUNE" from being made available to any persons not authorized to have access to such material by authority of Top Secret Control, Headquarters, Ninth Air Force, under Top Secret Control Bigot procedure.

2. Special Measures to be Employed Prior to D Day, on D Day and D-plus Days.

a. Counterintelligence procedures will be in accordance with Security directive, Headquarters, 52nd Troop Carrier Wing, as amended and promulgated in accordance with Ltr, Headquarters, IX Troop Carrier Command, 21 May 1944, subject: "Security Directive for Operation "NEPTUNE". (See Appendix "F" to F. O. 1, Headquarters, 52nd TC Wing, Operation "NEPTUNE").

b. Briefing levels will be as directed by the Commanding General, IX Troop Carrier Command.

c. Countersigns outside the United Kingdom will be in accordance with letter, "Subject Countersigns", Headquarters, Ninth Air Force, 21 May 1944.

3. P/W and E and E Procedure.

a. The S-2 Officer responsible for distribution of Aid Boxes and Purses will issue to the pilot of each aircraft one purse and one Aid Box for each combat crew member. A memorandum receipt will be accomplished by the pilot for the total number of Aid Boxes and Purses issued.

b. At the time of the issuance of Aid Boxes and Purses, the S-2 Officer will collect all personal property of each individual and will be responsible for the safekeeping of such property pending its return to the rightful owner. NO personal papers or official documents will be carried.

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c. Upon the return of the aircraft, the pilot will return all Aid Boxes and Purses to the S-2 Officer, at which time the personal property of the personnel of the aircraft will be returned to him. The pilot's memorandum receipt will be returned to him if all Aid Boxes, purses, and their contents are intact. In the event one or more Aid Boxes or purses, or the contents of either one or both are not returned, the S-2 Officer will itemize the missing Aid Boxes, purses or parts thereof and list the name, rank and serial number of the pilot and the personnel involved, include the date and time of mission and submit a detailed report of all matters incident thereto to the Commanding Officer of the Troop Carrier Wing, attention A-2. In the latter case, the S-2 Officer will retain the pilot's original memorandum receipt for Aid Boxes and purses pending release from Wing Headquarters, and will issue a temporary receipt to the pilot for the Aid Boxes, purses or parts thereof returned.

d. Glider crews will be furnished purses only. Procedure, responsibility, and accountability will be as above.

e. Escape and Evasion procedure will be in accordance with instructions previously disseminated to all units this Wing at meeting 19 May 1944, subject, Escape and Evasion procedure after D day.

4. Measures for Handling P/W and Captured Documents.

A Field Interrogation Unit of the PW and X Detachment, European theatre of Operations, will be attached to the Ninth Air Force for immediate interrogation of air prisoners captured in the field. Interrogation teams will operate in the combat zone under the control of the Chief of the Field Interrogation Unit. They will be disposed as indicated by the requirements of the tactical situation. Field interrogation will be as brief as possible with the object of gaining immediate intelligence for dissemination to units in the field. P/W should, in every case, be promptly turned over to the nearest P/W enclosure, camp or collecting point after search and segregation.

SECTION V - MAPS AND AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS

1. Maps. General map procedure will be as set forth in paragraph 14, Annex No. 1, "Intelligence plan", to Ninth Air Force Tactical plan for operation "NEPTUNE".

a. Operational Maps.

(1) 1,500,000 GSGS 4072 (Air), sheets, THE BORDER, MIDLANDS AND WALES, SOUTHWEST ENGLAND, NORTH SEA, STRAITS OF DOVER, LE HAVRE, PARIS, BREST, NANTES, DIJON.

(2) 1,250,000 GSGS 3982 (Air) Sheets, CHANNEL ISLANDS, BREST, LANNION, CHERBOURG, RENNES, ROUEN, BOULOGNEZ, CHARTRES.

(3) 1/4 inch to 1 mile, GSGS 3957, sheets, ENGLAND NORTHEAST, NORTH WALES AND MANCHESTER, NORTH MIDLANDS AND LINCOLNSHIRE, SOUTH WALES, MIDLANDS, EAST ANGLIA, ENGLAND SOUTHWEST, SOUTH ENGLAND, ENGLAND SOUTHEAST AND LONDON.

(4) Lattice Charts, GSGS 4153A, IC 2, sheets, ISLE OF MAN-IPSWICH, PEMBROKE-PARIS.

✓ (5) 1,50,000, GSGS 4250, sheets 5E/4, 5E/6, 6F/2, 6F/1 6E/5.
Also other miscellaneous sheets of area.

(6) (a) photomaps scale 1,25,000 of area.
(b) Special maps O-2 O-3 scale 1,50,000 run in.

b. Planning Maps.

(1) 1,25,000, Defense overprints - 28/20 Northeast, Northwest, Southeast, Southwest; 28/18 Northeast, Northwest, Southeast, southwest; 31/18 Northeast, Northwest, Southeast, Southwest. 31/20 Northeast, Northwest, Southeast, Southwest

c. Miscellaneous.

(1) Gazetteers, France, Belgium and Holland, 1,250,000 and 1,50,000.
(2) Town Plans, France.



2. Aerial Photographs.
 - a. Mosaic enlargements of DZ.
 - b. Mosaic of run-in strip.
 - c. Oblique photos of coastal strip.

SECTION VI WEATHER INFORMATION AND AIR-SEA RESCUE

1. Air-Sea Rescue Briefing.

Crews will be briefed by an officer trained in Air-Sea Rescue procedure on latest "ditching" procedures.

2. Weather Information Sources.

Latest weather information will be supplied through detachments of the 28th Weather Squadron at departure air-dromes at briefing time.

SECTION VII REPORTS AND DISSEMINATION

1. SOP for Intelligence Reports.

a. Ninth Air Force Memorandum No 55-8, "Operations Mission Report", 29 March 1944, and accompanying appendices, prescribes reporting procedure from lower echelons to higher headquarters.

b. Operational Intelligence Reports from Headquarters, Ninth Air Force to lower echelons will be rendered through normal channels unless operational urgency requires more direct transmission. Reports will include information of results of operations; changes in enemy order of battle, air and ground; status of enemy airfields; changes in target status; static defenses and enemy tactics.

2. Procedure for Detailed Intelligence Reports.

a. Immediately upon interrogation of returning crews group S-2's will transmit by the quickest possible means T.C. Flash Reports to Wing A-2's, who will, in turn, render Flash Reports by the most rapid possible means, using Form (Appendix "E") as directed by Memorandum No 55-8, Headquarters, Ninth Air Force, 29 March 1944.

b. "Operational Priority" will be requested for Flash Reports. Only in the event of failure of telephone communications will Flash Reports be sent by teleprinter from lower echelons to Wing.

c. Wing Mission Reports will be rendered within four hours after completion of missions to this Headquarters, by all Groups.

d. OPREP "B" (Form 34c), as prescribed by Ninth Air Force Memorandum No 55-8, 29 March 1944, will be prepared and delivered to this Headquarters within 36 hours after completion of mission.

3. Provision for Liaison Intelligence.

Headquarters, Ninth Air Force, will maintain communication with all Intelligence agencies and will maintain liaison personnel with First U.S. Army Group and 2nd Tactical Air Force, RAF. Direct communication will be authorized in specific instances by the Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2, Ninth Air Force. Authority for the establishment of liaison by the Intelligence sections of commands will parallel authority for the establishment of direct communication.

4. Intelligence Funds. Intelligence funds have been allotted to Headquarters, IX Troop Carrier Command. Such funds are to be expended only in accordance with paragraph 23, Theatre Intelligence Directive No 2, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Headquarters, ETOUSA, 27 November 1943, subject: "Intelligence Funds". Actual expenditures of these funds is to be made only upon approval of each expenditure by the Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2, Headquarters, IX Troop Carrier Command.



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5. Public Relations.

Public Relations activities will be in accordance with Memorandum No 45-3, Headquarters, Ninth Air Force, 29 January 1944, and Memorandum No 45-3, Headquarters, IX Troop Carrier Command, 21 February 1944.

6. History. Historical Officers of Troop Carrier Groups will insure the maintenance of historical records with supporting documents.

By CLARK:

PETTY

Executive

OFFICIAL:

[Signature]
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APPENDICES:

- Appendix A - Analysis of Terrain
- Appendix B - Analysis, Enemy Order of Battle --air
- Appendix C - Analysis, Enemy Order of Battle --Ground
- Appendix D - Analysis, Radar and W/T
- Appendix D-1 - Overlay, Radar and W/T
- Appendix E - Analysis, Enemy Static Defenses
- Appendix E-1 - Overlay, Enemy Static Defenses
- Appendix F - 52nd TC Wing Security Plan.

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